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Abstract 
 
The fact that the face is a source of diverse social signals allows us to 
use face and person perception as a model system for asking important 
psychological questions about how our brains are organised. A key issue 
concerns whether we rely primarily on some form of generic representation of 
the common physical source of these social signals (the face) to interpret 
them, or instead create multiple representations by assigning different aspects 
of the task to different specialist components. Variants of the specialist 
components hypothesis have formed the dominant theoretical perspective on 
face perception for more than three decades, but despite this dominance of 
formally and informally expressed theories the underlying principles and 
extent of any division of labour remain uncertain. Here, I discuss three 
important sources of constraint. First, the evolved structure of the brain. 
Second, the need to optimise responses to different everyday tasks. Third, the 
statistical structure of faces in the perceiver's environment. I show how these 
constraints interact to determine the underlying functional organisation of face 
and person perception. 
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Nowadays, many papers on face perception begin by noting the range of 
social signals conveyed by the face. From looking at someone's face we can 
infer something about their age, gender, and ethnic background, their moods 
and feelings, and we form impressions of their state of health, attractiveness 
and even their personality. This is what makes faces so fascinating. No other 
stimuli carry such a wide range of meanings for us, though voices (Belin, 
Fecteau, & Bdard, 2004; Campanella & Belin, 2007) and bodies (de Gelder, 
2016; Yovel & O'Toole, 2016) may well come close. Although many studies 
still focus on face recognition, the task of recognising whether or not we know 
someone is embedded in this much wider context of interpersonal perception 
and communication. 
This means that we can also exploit the fact that the face is a source of 
diverse social signals and use face perception as a model system for asking 
important psychological questions about how our brains are organised. Given 
the range of inferences we can make from looking at someone's face, a key 
issue concerns whether we rely primarily on some form of generic 
representation of the common physical source of these social signals (the 
face) to interpret them, or instead create multiple representations by assigning 
different aspects of the task to different specialist components. 
The theoretical paper by Bruce and Young (1986) was among the first to 
see the matter like this. Bruce and Young came down firmly on the side of the 
specialist components hypothesis, and proposed a rather baroque 
organisation that was mainly intended as a first stab at describing the 
theoretical landscape but has since proved surprisingly resilient 
(Schweinberger & Burton, 2011).  
 
----- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
The Bruce and Young (1986) model is shown in Figure 1. Broadly 
speaking, it proposed that following some form of initial perceptual encoding 
different aspects of facial signals such as identity and expression are 
analysed in parallel. It further emphasised the difference between processing 
the identities of familiar faces (recognised via 'face recognition units') and 
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unfamiliar faces ('directed visual processing'). It also suggested some form of 
hierarchical organisation of components within each functional pathway. 
We don't need to concern ourselves here with all of the details of Bruce 
and Young (1986), but it is worth reiterating its relationship to contemporary 
models of word and object recognition. First, ideas about naming mechanisms 
(Oldfield, 1966; Ratcliff and Newcombe, 1982) were represented in the 
different components of the pathway responsible for familiar face recognition. 
Second, Morton's (1979) revised logogen model inspired the idea of face 
recognition units (Hay & Young, 1982). Third, dual-route models of reading 
(Coltheart, 1981; Marshall & Newcombe, 1973) were reflected in the 
difference between familiar faces (cf. words) and unfamiliar faces (treated as 
like pronounceable nonwords in some respects), with the dual-route aspect 
leading to the difference between the 'face recognition unit' and 'directed 
visual processing' pathways. 
Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Bruce and Young (1986) 
can be found elsewhere (Schweinberger & Burton, 2011; Young & Bruce, 
2011). All that needs to be said here is that different variants of the specialist 
components hypothesis have formed the dominant theoretical perspective 
across the three decades since Bruce and Young (1986). What I want to 
address here, however, is not the detailed question of which model variant is 
the best fit to what we now know, but rather the deeper and I think more 
profound question of why our brains should be organised in this way. What is 
it that drives the underlying functional separation? This is a key issue, yet the 
question is seldom raised. When Calder and Young (2005) approached the 
question more than a decade ago in reviewing studies of the relation between 
recognition of facial identity and facial expression, the underlying principles 
and extent of any division of labour remained uncertain. Now I hope we can 
do a bit better. 
There have been some attempts at relatively high-level explanations of 
reasons underlying functional specialisation. Fodor's (1983) views on 
modularity have been widely discussed, and studies in cognitive 
neuropsychology were strongly influenced by and supportive of assumptions 
of modularity or discrete functional pathways (Caramazza, 1984, 1986; 
Coltheart, 2017; Ellis & Young, 1988). One idea that Vicki Bruce and I found 
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particularly interesting (though for some reason we didn't cite it in Bruce & 
Young, 1986) was Marr's (1982) suggestion that "any large computation 
should be split up into a collection of small, nearly independent, specialized 
subprocesses"  (ÔVisionÕ, 1982, p.325). Unless this is done, Marr pointed out 
that a change in one part of the system could have unintended consequences 
throughout. 
My aim here is to see whether it is possible to offer something that can 
give a more detailed understanding than these overarching principles. I will 
discuss examples from the field of face and person perception that reflect 
three important sources of constraint, and show how and why each may exert 
its influence. First, the evolved structure of the brain. Second, the need to 
optimise responses to different everyday tasks. Third, the statistical structure 
of faces in the perceiver's environment. I realise that this tripartite division has 
some rough edges and overlapping parts, but I don't think this matters much 
for my primary purpose, which is to consider these sources of constraint in 
turn whilst showing how they may interact to determine the underlying 
functional organisation of the face perception system. 
 
The evolved structure of the brain 
 
Constraints that result from the evolved structure of the brain are 
perhaps the first that will spring to mind. Certainly they seem to be the most 
widely discussed and debated. We know that there is a long evolutionary 
background to human social abilities (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007), making it 
possible that there is some form of evolved neural substrate for face and 
person perception (Kanwisher, 2000). Indeed co-evolution between the 
structure of our faces and brains is clearly suggested by Waller, Cray and 
Burrows' (2008) finding of high consistency across individuals in the anatomy 
of facial muscles essential to producing what are often considered to be 
universal facial expressions, implying that these may be subject to a selection 
pressure for effective nonverbal communication. Similarly, it has also been 
suggested that the structure of human faces has evolved to signal individual 
identity (Sheehan & Nachman, 2014). Consistent with such ideas, recent 
studies have shown significant heritability and genetic specificity of face 
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recognition ability (Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015; Verhallen et al., 2014; Wilmer 
et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2010). 
In line with earlier and less precise behavioural methods (e.g. Rizzolatti, 
Umilta & Berlucchi, 1971; Young & Bion, 1980; Young & Ellis, 1976), 
functional brain imaging has revealed highly consistent differential regional 
responses to faces in the adult brain. The key technique was introduced by 
Kanwisher, McDermott and Chun (1997), who used fMRI to identify regions in 
individual participants' brains that were more highly responsive to faces than 
to many other visual stimuli. This 'functional localiser' technique has been 
used in many subsequent studies (Kanwisher, 2017). Even though the 
method is usually applied at the individual participant level, it consistently 
identifies regions (shown in the upper panel of Figure 2) in the lateral fusiform 
gyrus (often called the fusiform face area, or FFA), in inferior occipital gyri (the 
occipital face area, or OFA), and in the posterior part of the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS/pSTS) (Andrews, Baseler, Jenkins, Burton, & Young, 2016; 
Andrews, Davies-Thompson, Kingstone, & Young, 2010; Baseler, Harris, 
Young, & Andrews, 2014; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Kanwisher et al., 
1997; Kanwisher, 2017). 
 
----- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
There has been discussion as to whether these localisable regions 
themselves represent anatomically discrete functional components of the face 
perception system or instead correspond to the regions of peak activation in a 
more distributed system (Haxby, Gobbini, Furey, Ishai, Schouten & Pietrini, 
2001), but either view accepts that there is a remarkably consistent 
organisation, and this has also been noted in other studies (Hasson, Nir, 
Levy, Fuhrmann, & Malach, 2004; Polk, Park, Smith, & Park, 2007). 
An influential theoretical paper by Haxby, Hoffman and Gobbini (2000) 
suggested that OFA, FFA and pSTS form a core system involved in the visual 
analysis of faces, as shown in the upper panel of Figure 2. Whilst it 
undoubtedly involves both feedforward and feedback projections, Haxby et al. 
(2000) proposed that this core system has distinct functional pathways for 
dealing with properties of faces such as expression that can change from 
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moment to moment (an OFA to pSTS pathway) and properties such as 
identity that are relatively invariant (an OFA to FFA pathway). This core 
system then acts in concert with other brain regions to form an extended 
system that allows further processing of facial information and integration with 
other sources. 
As Figure 2 also shows, and Haxby et al. (2000) acknowledged, their 
model offers a synthesis of the more functional questions that concerned 
Bruce and Young (1986) with evidence concerning neural organisation. To 
emphasise the strong family resemblance to Haxby et al. (2000), the Bruce 
and Young (1986) model has been rotated through 90 degrees in Figure 2 
(see Calder & Young, 2005). Importantly, however, the Haxby et al. model 
also shows how the organisation of face perception may dovetail with more 
general principles underlying brain organisation, such as dorsal and ventral 
streams (see Bruce & Young, 2012). Striking findings that fit Haxby et al.'s 
model have been made in cognitive neuroscience studies (Baseler et al., 
2012; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Pitcher, 2014), though some questions have 
been raised too (e.g. Atkinson & Adolphs, 2011; Bernstein & Yovel, 2015; 
Duchaine & Yovel, 2015; Pitcher, Duchaine, & Walsh, 2014; Rossion, 2008). 
None the less, generic evolved constraints can't offer the full picture, 
since we know that brain organisation is to some extent under the influence of 
learning and adaptation to the environment. This is evident in brain imaging 
studies demonstrating that although the core face-responsive brain regions 
are present from an early age, they clearly undergo protracted development 
(Golarai et al.,2007; Deen et al., 2017). We know too that although even 
newborn infants can show responses to face-like stimuli (Johnson, 
Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991), these innate abilities work together with 
the prevalence of faces in the visual world of young infants (Fausey, 
Jayaraman, & Smith, 2016; Jayaraman, Fausey, & Smith, 2017) to create 
conditions that promote effective learning (Johnson, Senju, & Tomalski, 2015; 
Morton & Johnson, 1991). Indeed, the role of learning and development is 
clearly evident in many infant studies, including the interesting work on 
perceptual narrowing showing that infants become less adept at remembering 
pictures of monkey faces as they become more experienced with human 
faces (Kelly et al., 2007; Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002; Pascalis et al., 
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2005) in a way that forms an interesting potential parallel to perceptual 
narrowing in language development (Pascalis, Dole, & Loevenbruck, 2017; 
Vihman, 2017). Then of course as adults we remain susceptible to effects of 
previous experience, as shown for example by other-race effects (Rossion & 
Michel, 2011; Yan, Andrews, & Young, 2016; Yan, Andrews, Jenkins, & 
Young, 2016; Yan, Young, & Andrews, 2017a, 2017b) whose origin can again 
be traced back to experience in early years (e.g. Kelly et al., 2007; Lee, 
Quinn, & Pascalis, 2017; Tham, Bremner, & Hay, 2015, 2017). 
Whilst the evolutionary background clearly offers an important source of 
constraint, then, we need to understand how it interacts with other factors. 
The demands of everyday life offer important examples. 
 
The need to optimise responses to different everyday tasks 
 
I will use recognition of face identity and facial expression to illustrate 
how everyday tasks can shape the optimal organisation of perceptual 
mechanisms. Identity and expression offer a good example to discuss 
because they were so clearly flagged as distinct by Bruce and Young (1986) 
and Haxby et al. (2000). 
Bruce and Young's (1986) starting point was that a core requirement of 
face recognition is to be able to recognise the faces of people we know across 
different expressions, whereas a core requirement of facial expression 
recognition is to be able to recognise expressions across different identities. 
So at some level there must be some degree of separation between 
mechanisms involved in recognising identity and expression. Otherwise we 
would find ourselves susceptible to errors that would severely affect our 
everyday lives, such as failing to recognise a familiar face with an unusual 
expression. This doesn't happen; even highly unusual expressions such as 
those created by the Thatcher illusion have little impact on our ability to 
recognise familiar face identities (Psalta, Young, Thompson, & Andrews, 
2014a, 2014b; Thompson 1980; Thompson, Anstis, Rhodes, Jeffrey, & 
Valentine, 2009). 
Some findings suggest that this separation between identity and 
expression arises at relatively early stages of perception, because there are 
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clear differences in the susceptibility of identity and expression recognition to 
different stimulus transforms. For example in behavioural studies contrast 
negation of photographs makes it very hard to recognise face identity, but has 
only a limited effect on recognising facial expressions (Bruce & Young, 1998; 
White, 2001). Parallel findings have been noted in fMRI, where responses 
from the FFA are sensitive to contrast polarity changes whilst responses from 
pSTS are relatively insensitive (Harris, Young, & Andrews, 2014a). 
Such data imply differences in the types of information that are used to 
analyse identity and expression. More specifically, they have been taken to 
suggest that surface texture patterns that are disrupted by contrast negation 
are critical to recognising face identity and that feature shapes are important 
to interpreting facial expression. These differences, though, are clearly 
relative rather than absolute, since manipulations that minimise variation in 
surface texture or differences in feature shapes can both affect facial 
expression recognition, showing that both types of information can contribute 
(Sormaz, Young, & Andrews, 2016b). 
A useful exercise is to look more closely at the everyday demands of 
face identity and expression recognition. I already mentioned that a core 
requirement is to be able to recognise familiar faces across different 
expressions and to recognise facial expressions across different identities, but 
there are other important differences too. Consider the complexity of the task. 
Most of us can recognise hundreds (perhaps thousands) of familiar faces. In 
contrast, although we don't know how many distinct facial expressions exist, 
and a complicating factor is that some expressions seem to be universal 
whilst others are more culture-specific, most theories put the number of 
recognisable expressions well below a hundred. However, as well as 
recognising this relatively small number of expressions we need to interpret 
their intensities; seeing whether someone is a bit frightened or very frightened 
can be a critical difference. Moreover, it is important to note that blends of 
different expressions can be meaningful (Du, Tao, & Martinez, 2014). 
Comparable requirements mostly don't exist for face identity recognition, 
where differences between images of the same face are identity-irrelevant (a 
point whose implications will be looked at in more detail later). 
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The implications for our behaviour are different, too. Recognising 
someone's identity allows you to access previously stored semantic and 
episodic information that facilitates appropriate interaction. In contrast, 
emotional expressions modulate ongoing priorities (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
1987, 2014); if someone looks afraid or angry, you immediately interrupt what 
you were doing and search for a reason. Finally, the temporal demands of 
identity recognition are relatively low, because once you have recognised 
someone their identity doesn't change during a social encounter. In contrast, 
expression recognition has high temporal demands (Young & Bruce, 2011); 
someone's mood can change in an instant, and such changes need 
constantly to be monitored. 
How do these pervasive differences in everyday task demands influence 
the functional organisation we have noted? I will approach this question by 
looking at the implications of neuropsychological findings. In line with 
burgeoning interest in the 1980s in using neuropsychological evidence to test 
and refine cognitive models (Ellis & Young, 1988; Shallice, 1988), Bruce and 
Young (1986) placed considerable emphasis on the consequences of brain 
injury for recognising face identity and expression. From the limited evidence 
available to them, they concluded that there was something akin to a 
neuropsychological double dissociation between impairments affecting face 
identity and facial expression. This turned out in part to be a 
misrepresentation, but the reasons why it misrepresented things have proved 
important. 
Let's start by considering neuropsychological impairments of face 
identity recognition. The most widely-documented of these is prosopagnosia, 
with case descriptions dating back to the Nineteenth Century (for examples, 
see Della Sala & Young, 2003; Ellis & Florence, 1990; Young & van de Wal, 
1996). The loss of ability to recognise familiar faces that is a key defining 
symptom of acquired prosopagnosia due to brain injury has a number of 
consistent characteristics (Meadows, 1974; Hcaen 1981; Young, 2011). It is 
severe, such that even close family members may not be recognised. It is 
pervasive, with nearly all faces being affected and no previously recognised 
categories spared (for example, there are no reported cases of patients who 
can still recognise politicians but can't recognise television personalities they 
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knew before their brain injury). It is specific to the visual modality, with familiar 
people still being recognised from non-facial cues such as their voices (Liu et 
al., 2016) or names (Young, Hellawell, & de Haan, 1988). Finally, it is 
selective to face recognition, in the sense that other aspects of face 
perception (including recognition of expression) may be less severely 
compromised (Bruyer et al.,1983; Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen, & 
Humphreys, 2008). 
In sum, cases of acquired prosopagnosia show that face recognition is 
to some extent dissociable from other aspects of face perception and from 
recognition based on the personÕs voice or name. They form an interesting 
contrast with cases involving loss of memory for people, in which a more 
central semantic deficit leads to failure to recognise familiar people from their 
face, voice, or name (de Haan, Young, & Newcombe, 1991; Ellis, Young, & 
Critchley,1989; Hanley, Young, & Pearson, 1989). In general, the brain 
lesions associated with prosopagnosia are located in relatively ventral and 
posterior occipito-temporal cortex whereas loss of memory for people follows 
more anterior temporal lobe damage (Barton & Corrow, 2016; Gainotti, 2014). 
In fMRI, image-invariant familiar face adaptation also involves relatively 
anterior regions (Weibert et al., 2016). 
Based on evidence available at the time, Bruce and Young (1986) 
tended to think of neuropsychological impairments of facial expression 
recognition as having a complementary pattern to acquired prosopagnosia. 
That is expression recognition impairments were expected to be face-specific 
(with recognition of non-facial expressive cues being less affected), to affect 
the recognition of all facial expressions, and to have little effect on ability to 
recognise face identity. These complementary patterns would, of course, 
create what Shallice (1988) called a strong double dissociation between 
impairments of face identity and facial expression recognition. 
Some later studies using careful techniques initially tended to support 
these views (Parry, Young, Saul, & Moss, 1991; Young, Newcombe, de Haan, 
Small, & Hay, 1993; Young et al., 1995), but with the benefit of hindsight they 
suffered two limitations. First, they only used overall scores for facial 
expression recognition, and didn't disaggregate the different emotions used in 
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tasks. Second, they didn't test expressions of emotion outside the facial 
domain. 
The first limitation was dramatically exposed in a study by Adolphs, 
Tranel, Damasio and Damasio (1994). Their participant, case SM, had 
suffered bilateral calcification of the amygdala due to Urbach-Wiethe disease. 
Rather than measuring SM's overall ability to recognise facial expressions, 
however, Adolphs et al. (1994) used an approach which showed that not all 
emotions were equally severely affected. Instead, SM's recognition of facial 
expressions of fear was particularly poor. 
At the time, my colleagues and I were investigating a case that also 
involved selective bilateral amygdala damage, but with a different aetiology 
resulting from surgery for relief of otherwise intractable epilepsy (Young et al., 
1995). We had found that our participant, DR, showed relatively well-
preserved recognition of familiar face identity but experienced problems in 
perceiving direction of gaze and recognising facial expressions. What we had 
not done was to look separately at her recognition of different emotions. 
 
----- FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
To produce a sensitive test of facial expression recognition we 
developed an 'emotion hexagon' procedure, as shown in Figure 3 (Calder et 
al.,1996; Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). This took 
the images of prototype expressions of six basic emotions (happiness, 
surprise, fear, sadness, disgust, and anger) for one of the models from the 
Ekman and Friesen (1976) series of facial expressions, located these 
expressions around the perimeter of a hexagon in which each emotion was 
placed next to those it was most likely to be confused with, and then created 
30 morphed expression images that traversed this perimeter. By presenting 
these 30 images in random order and asking which of the 6 emotions each 
was most like, we could chart DR's recognition of emotion across different 
levels of task difficulty (as reflected in the degree to which the test image was 
morphed away from the nearest prototype expression). The results (see 
Figure 3) revealed that DR showed normal recognition of happiness and 
sadness and particularly poor recognition of fear and anger (Calder et al., 
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1996). A comparable test of face identity recognition based on a morphed 
hexagon of familiar faces showed that DR had no difficulty with this, 
demonstrating normal recognition of familiar identity (Calder et al., 1996). 
The findings of Adolphs et al. (1994) and Calder et al. (1996) fitted 
neatly together to show clearly that facial expression recognition impairments 
can be to some extent category-specific, affecting the recognition of some 
emotions more than others. What these studies didn't do, though, was to test 
recognition of emotions from sources other than facial expression. When we 
tested DR's recognition of auditorily expressed emotions (Scott et al., 1997), 
we again found particularly poor recognition of fear and anger; exactly the 
same emotions as were poorly recognised from facial expressions. Multi-
modal deficits of emotion recognition affecting recognition of fear were also 
found in another case of bilateral amygdala damage reported by 
Sprengelmeyer et al. (1999). In fact, deficits in the experience of the emotion 
of fear itself were also evident in bilateral amygdala cases that we studied 
(Broks et al., 1998; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999). Similarly, although an early 
report suggested intact recognition of emotion from speech prosody (Adolphs 
& Tranel, 1999), later follow-ups of SM have shown impaired recognition of 
emotion from music (Gosselin, Peretz, Johnsen, & Adolphs, 2007) and highly 
atypical experience of fear (Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2011). 
The effect of bilateral amygdala damage on fear can be contrasted with 
other neuropsychological cases that show selective problems with disgust 
following damage to the insula and putamen (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, 
& Young, 2000) or problems encompassing all emotions in frontal variant 
frontotemporal dementia (Keane, Calder, Hodges, & Young, 2002; Van den 
Stock et al., 2015). These deficits typically encompass not just face and voice 
perception, but interpretation of body cues as well. Experience of emotion can 
also be affected. 
Converging evidence from fMRI has also emphasised the contribution of 
different brain regions to different emotions (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 
2001; Morris et al.,1996; Phillips et al., 1997), but for now I want to focus on 
the implications of the fact that the patterns of neuropsychological impairment 
of emotion recognition are so unlike those we were seeking. Using the 
analogy with prosopagnosia, we expected to find problems affecting 
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recognition of all facial expressions but leaving the recognition of emotion 
from voices or bodies relatively intact. Instead, what has gradually come to 
light is that emotion recognition impairments are intrinsically multimodal but at 
the same time they can affect some emotions more than others. We have to 
ask why this should be the case. 
An appealing hypothesis is again that the patterns of breakdown reflect 
an underlying organisation that is strongly influenced by everdyay task 
demands (Young & Bruce, 2011). Consider identity recognition. This will often 
involve a unimodal input (the person may be seen but not heard), but identity 
does not change from moment to moment during a social encounter (once 
you have recognised someone, you don't need to keep doing it). Hence a 
unimodal system can offer a good solution. For emotion recognition, however, 
things are quite different. We need constantly to monitor rapidly changing 
signals (someone's mood can change in an instant), these signals can be of 
high priority (for example, reflecting different types of threat), and the cues to 
emotion are often simultaneously expressed across multiple channels (face, 
voice, and body). Hence it is adaptive that emotion recognition seems to be to 
some extent organised around emotion categories and to be able to make use 
of multi-modal inputs (Carroll & Young, 2005; Young, 2016). In these 
respects, it differs markedly from familiar face recognition in ways that are 
consistent with the differing demands of these everyday tasks. 
Much the same point is evident from behavioural repetition effects. 
Whilst recognising a face leads to a long-lasting facilitation for recognising the 
same face again (Bruce & Valentine, 1985; Ellis, Young, Flude, & Hay, 1987), 
recognising the face's expression confers no long-term advantage to 
recognising that expression at a later date (Ellis, Young, & Flude, 1990). This 
otherwise puzzling pattern can again be seen to reflect the fact that it is useful 
to retain some degree of facilitation for recognising the identities of recently 
encountered faces, in case they are encountered again. However, it would be 
counterproductive to expect that someone will always have the same 
expression, as this would interfere with detecting potentially important 
changes in mood; hence the absence of long-term priming of expression 
recognition. Again, the characteristics of human face perception seem to fit 
the environmental demands (see also Taubert, Alais, & Burr, 2016). 
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This point is underlined if we look more closely at the multi-modal 
properties of emotion recognition and compare them to speech perception as 
another example in which concurrent cues to a rapidly changing signal are 
often available from our voices (speech sounds) and faces (the movements 
needed to produce each sound). Although we are used to a 'common sense' 
way of thinking about speech perception entirely in terms of decoding the 
acoustic signal, and of course we know that purely acoustic analyses can 
support speech perception when we listen to a radio or talk to someone on 
the telephone, there is none the less substantial evidence that seeing 
someone's facial movements can make an important contribution. 
The most well-known example is the McGurk illusion (McGurk & 
MacDonald, 1976), in which a video showing the face of a person saying one 
phoneme (for example, "ga") is combined with a different phoneme (for 
example, "ba") on the soundtrack. Remarkably, the heard phoneme can then 
correspond neither to the auditory nor the visual part of the video, but is 
usually a fusion of the two (heard as "da" in the example we used). The 
illusion shows that in hearing what someone says we make use of the 
correspondence between movements of their lips (and tongue) and the 
speech sounds. 
An important clue to why this happens comes from a classic study of 
speech perception in noise reported by Miller and Nicely (1955), who noted a 
substantial improvement when the speaker's face was visible. In considering 
the cause of this effect, they noted that ÔThe place of articulation, which was 
hardest to hear in our tests, is the easiest of features to see on a talker's lips. 
The other features are hard to see, but easy to hearÕ (Miller & Nicely, 1955, p. 
352). Considered more generally, it seems that because speech signals 
involve rapid temporal changes that have to be decoded as they occur, 
integrating complementary information from face and voice offers an optimal 
way of dealing with these temporal constraints. Studies of infants suggest that 
sensitivity to these audio-visual correspondences begins early in life (Kuhl & 
Meltzoff, 1982; Patterson & Werker, 2003). 
Functional brain imaging studies offer an important contribution here by 
identifying brain regions that are involved in lipreading. Calvert and her 
colleagues (Calvert, Campbell, & Brammer, 2000; Calvert Hansen, Iversen, & 
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Brammer, 2001) introduced the stringent criterion that an unequivocally multi-
modal region will show a supra-additive response to audio-visual stimuli. That 
is, a multi-modal brain region will show more activation to an audiovisual 
stimulus  than the sum of its responses to purely auditory stimuli or to purely 
visual stimuli. A region that has repeatedly been found to meet Calvert's 
supra-additive criterion in audio-visual integration studies using talking faces 
is located in the vicinity of the left posterior superior temporal sulcus and 
perhaps left superior temporal gyrus (Calvert, 2001). The importance of left 
pSTS to audio-visual integration has been confirmed by demonstrating that 
TMS to this region disrupts the McGurk effect (Beauchamp, Nath, & Pasalar, 
2010). 
Even so, posterior left STS should not be overinterpreted as the only 
region involved in audiovisual integration of speech; it clearly forms part of a 
larger network that is apparent in studies that have used different criteria 
(Hall, Fussell, & Summerfield, 2005; Macaluso, George, Dolan, Spence, & 
Driver, 2004; Wright, Pelphrey, Allison, McKeown, & McCarthy, 2003). This 
network includes other regions along the superior temporal sulcus and 
superior temporal gyrus that include classical auditory areas. The point of 
principal interest here, however, is that the region of left pSTS that shows a 
supra-additive response to audiovisual speech is close to or likely part of 
Haxby et al.'s (2000) core system that they identify as heavily involved in 
perceiving changeable aspects of faces.  
With this background of key facts about audio-visual integration in 
speech perception in mind, we need to look again at the possibility of audio-
visual integration in emotion recognition. The first thing that needs to be said 
is that although our moods can change from moment to moment, the speed 
and complexity of such changes is unlikely to approach the demands of 
speech perception. However, there is behavioural as well as 
neuropsychological evidence consistent with a multi-modal contribution to 
emotion recognition (de Gelder, Stienen, & Van den Stock, 2013; Lewis, 
Lefevre, & Young, 2016; Schirmer & Adolphs, 2017). For example, de Gelder 
and Vroomen (2000) asked participants to classify morphed images of faces 
from a happy to sad continuum as happy or sad, but with each face presented 
either on its own or accompanied by a semantically neutral sentence read 
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with a happy or sad tone of voice. Participants were instructed to ignore the 
voice, but they were unable to do this; compared to the 'no voice' baseline the 
proportion of sad classifications was increased by the sad voice and 
decreased by the happy voice. A further experiment by de Gelder and 
Vroomen (2000) showed that the interaction between faces and voices is 
bidirectional, with facial emotion interfering with vocal emotion and vice versa.  
Such findings are not exactly the same as the McGurk effect; the result 
can be interpreted as a bias rather than a novel emotion percept. In this 
respect, neuroimaging studies again offer important evidence. Hagan et al. 
(2009) used purely nonverbal audio-visual stimuli (Ekman faces and 
nonverbal sounds) in MEG to demonstrate a supra-additive response to 
audiovisual emotion from right STG/STS; this had a clear posterior focus but 
also included much of the right STS. Because of the excellent temporal 
resolution of MEG, this activation could be seen within 200 ms of stimulus 
onset, as shown in Figure 4. This supra-additive response to audio-visual 
emotion is therefore centred on a region in the right hemisphere that is 
opposite the left hemisphere region that responds supra-additively to audio-
visual speech, and its early onset (within 200 ms) implies that it reflects an 
involuntary integrative mechanism. 
 
----- FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
A follow-up MEG study by Hagan et al. (2013) used a combination of 
faces with neutral words spoken with emotional prosody to again reveal a fast 
supra-additive response to audio-visual emotional stimuli from right posterior 
STG/STS, showing that this region responds to audio-visual emotion even in 
a context involving spoken words. It seems that, like speech perception, 
emotion recognition is to some extent a multi-modal phenomenon, and that 
whereas the left posterior STS/STG region is implicated in audio-visual 
integration of speech (Calvert, 2001) an equivalent region on the right side of 
the brain is implicated in audio-visual integration of emotion. As for lipreading, 
we should note that this is likely to be only a part of a more extensive network 
for multi-modal analysis (Park et al., 2010). None the less, it seems to form a 
critical part of this network and this right posterior STG/STS region is again 
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close to or overlapping with Haxby et al.'s (2000) posterior STS region 
hypothesised to be involved in analysing changeable aspects of faces. 
However, although forming part of Haxby et al.'s 'core visual system' for 
faces, posterior STS also seems to be a key component of a system involved 
in biological motion perception (Hein & Knight, 2008; Pelphrey, Morris, 
Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005), predictive coding (Johnston et al., 
2017) and multi-modal integration as well as purely visually-driven responses 
to faces (Calder and Young, 2005; Peelen, Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 2010). 
Although the details of the various studies I have mentioned may seem 
complex, the key point I want to emphasise here is the way that these 
different findings fit together from an overarching perspective. Like speech 
perception, emotion recognition has temporal characteristics that make it 
useful to take advantage of any cross-modal cue complementarity, and as for 
speech perception we find that a brain region that shows an involvement in 
multi-modal responses more generally plays an important role. The everyday 
task demands and the evolved structure of the brain work in concert to 
determine the functional organisation. 
 
The statistical structure of faces in the perceiver's environment 
 
I mentioned already that studies of infant learning show perceptual 
narrowing toward human faces as the baby acquires more experience with 
these. Interestingly, the extent of this perceptual narrowing can be reduced if 
non-human faces are more strongly present in the environment. Both 
phenomena show how the faces that are seen can shape perceptual 
organisation (Kelly et al., 2007; Pascalis et al., 2002, 2005). Whilst it seems 
likely that this ability is never entirely lost, it may well be reduced in adulthood 
in much the same way that adults experience difficulty with many things (such 
as learning a new language) that would have been easier earlier in life. We 
know, for example, from numerous studies of other-race effects that such 
influences can be difficult to modify in adulthood (Rossion & Michel, 2011). 
None the less, perceptual adaptation effects also show the possibility of short-
term recalibration within the boundaries of what our visual systems have 
already experienced as well-known (Hsu & Young, 2004; Webster, Kaping, 
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Mizokami, & Duhamel, 2004).!Such studies show something of the ability of 
our perceptual systems to adapt to the 'diet' of the faces in the current 
environment (Rhodes, 2017; Webster & MacLeod, 2011), though the precise 
relation between short-term and long-term changes remains uncertain. !
However, the point I want to emphasise now is different from these more 
general observations of plasticity and its limits. It is becoming clear that the 
image properties of faces themselves can influence how optimally to extract 
different types of information. This has profound implications. 
Let's return to the question of the relation between recognising face 
identity and facial expression. We already saw that there are abundant 
differences in the demands of these everyday tasks that have a substantial 
impact on how best to achieve them. However we also noted that there are 
potential differences in the types of information that our visual systems use to 
analyse identity and expression (Harris et al., 2014a; Sormaz et al., 2016b), 
and I want to explore these a bit more carefully. 
We can think of a face photograph, or any image of a face that falls on 
the retina of our eyes, as involving two distinct properties (Bruce & Young, 
1998, 2012; Sutherland, Rhodes, & Young, 2017a). First, it represents 2D 
facial shape; the positions and shapes of features (eyebrows, nose, mouth, 
chin, etc.) as they are located in the image. Second, it represents the facial 
surface; the brightness and colour of features, skin and hair, including shading 
cues to 3D facial shape from ambient lighting. Computer image manipulation 
methods often begin by establishing the location of a set of landmark fiducial 
points that define the image's 2D shape and then use these fiducials to 
subdivide the image into a large number of smaller regions that can represent 
surface colour and brightness values (Tiddeman, Burt, & Perrett, 2001; see 
Sutherland et al., 2017a). 
Using similar methods Calder, Burton, Miller, Young and Akamatsu 
(2001) investigated the image statistics that underlie representations of facial 
identity and expression through a principal component analysis (PCA) of the 
shape and surface properties of images from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
series of 'Pictures of facial affect'. In this context image shapes are defined 
through the 2D fiducial locations in each photograph, and surface properties 
can then be compared by reshaping all of the photographs to a common 
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(averaged) set of fiducial positions. PCA is a data reduction technique that 
finds a set of principal components (PCs) that best accounts for the observed 
variations in shape and surface properties across the different images. 
Calder et al. (2001) analysed the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
photographs because these are a well-validated set used in many previous 
studies and they include expressions of different emotions and different 
models (identities). Having used PCA to find PCs of shape and surface 
variation, Calder et al. used linear discriminant analysis (LDA) to try to decode 
the expression or the identity of the faces from the photographs in the set. 
They found that different combinations of PCs can be used successfully to 
decode expression or identity, but with two important caveats. First, multiple 
PCs are always needed. Second, whilst some PCs are mainly useful for 
decoding expression and some are mainly useful for decoding identity, other 
PCs are useful for both identity and expression. 
Before discussing the implications of this, we need to note that it seems 
unlikely that the brain itself uses PCA as a perceptual mechanism. Its purpose 
here is simply that the combination of PCA and LDA offers a convenient way 
to explore any underlying image statistics the brain might be able to exploit. 
Being able to do this is important in its own right. 
From this perspective, Calder et al.'s (2001) data are clear. A simple way 
to think of the findings is that they show that expression and identity can be 
represented through combinations of PCs, but not in a fully exclusive manner. 
Whilst there are differences between the visual properties underlying identity 
and expression, there is also substantial covariation. 
These findings concerning image properties may help explain data that 
are inconsistent with a complete segregation between facial identity and 
expression processing. Many studies have sought to explore the limits of the 
separation between identity and expression. They have shown that some 
cross-talk between facial identity and expression does seem to occur in 
certain circumstances. For familiar faces, characteristic expressions can 
slightly benefit recognition (Kaufmann & Schweinberger, 2004). For unfamiliar 
faces interference in the Garner paradigm reveals that changes in face 
identity can influence judgements about facial expression (Schweinberger & 
Soukup, 1998; Schweinberger, Burton, & Kelly, 1999; Atkinson, Tipples, Burt, 
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& Young, 2005). In a parallel with findings based on Garner interfence, 
adaptation paradigms show that adaptation to expression is influenced by a 
change in identity (Ellamil, Susskind, & Anderson, 2008; Fox & Barton, 2007; 
Pell & Richards, 2013; Rhodes et al., 2015) whereas adaptation to identity is 
less affected by a change in expression (Fox, Oruc & Barton, 2008). In our 
previously mentioned case study of the effect of bilateral amygdala lesions 
(Calder et al., 1996; Young et al., 1995), participant DR experienced 
difficulties in unfamiliar face identity matching tasks when the faces' identities 
were discrepant with their expressions; for example, in deciding that two 
photographs with different expressions showed the same face (Young, 
Hellawell, van de Wal, & Johnson,1996). Similarly, interactions between 
identity and expression have also been noted in an early component of ERPs 
from neurologically normal participants (Fisher, Towler, & Eimer, 2016). The 
underlying covariation between some aspects of facial identity and expression 
revealed by PCA helps us to understand why these interactions may occur. 
Of course, the potential role of facial movements also needs to be 
considered. Although a particular strength of the Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
stimuli is that they are grounded in a careful analysis of the muscle 
movements involved in producing different expressions, as photographs they 
don't contain any information that might derive from the timing of the 
movements themselves. We need to keep in mind that the fact that facial 
expressions shown in photographs can be recognisable does not mean that 
movement is unimportant. On the contrary, there is evidence that the timing of 
facial movements is carefully balanced between the needs of the sender and 
the intended recipient, even for a facial signal as apparently simple as raising 
the corners of the mouth in a smile (Leonard, Voeller, & Kuldau, 1991). For 
expressions that are too subtle to be easily seen in static displays, too, a role 
for patterns of movement has been found; movement can draw attention to 
small but critical changes (Ambadar, Schooler, & Cohn, 2005). However, the 
good recognition of photographs of normal intensity basic emotions such as 
those used by Ekman and Friesen (1976) shows, for these emotions at least, 
either that the apex of the set of muscle contractions forms a recognisable 
configuration of the facial features or that we are very skilled at estimating the 
implied motion (Martinez, 2003). Likewise, studies I have been involved with 
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have not found much in the way of differences between moving and static 
expressions of basic emotions (Johnston, Mayes, Hughes, & Young, 2013; 
Harris, Young, & Andrews, 2014b). So, despite its intuitive appeal, we need 
also to be careful not to overstate the role of movement in facial expression 
recognition (Young, 2016). 
Further evidence of the usefulness of image statistics can be found if we 
consider the perceptual similarity between different facial expressions. Some 
expressions, for example surprise and fear, look more similar than others, 
such as surprise and disgust. This perceptual similarity was of course the 
underlying principle used to create the emotion hexagon shown in Figure 3, 
but it can be expanded by considering the similarity between every possible 
pairing of expressions of basic emotions. Importantly, image statistics 
concerning the shape and surface properties of the images can be used to 
model perceptual similarity ratings for facial expressions (Sormaz et al., 
2016a); the expressions people judge as being more similar have more 
similar shape and surface properties. Interestingly, it also turns out that neural 
responses recorded with fMRI from Haxby et al.Õs (2000) core regions of OFA 
and pSTS track the perceptual similarity of expressions (Sormaz, Watson, 
Smith, Young, & Andrews, 2016a), with more similar patterns of activation in 
these regions to the more similar expressions. These core regions represent 
Haxby et al.'s (2000) pathway for analysing changeable aspects of faces, but 
in Sormaz et al.'s (2016a) study their responses were measured with purely 
static stimuli.   
Understanding image statistics, then, offers a valuable perspective on 
how we recognise facial identity and expression, and exemplifies a distinct 
type of constraint on perceptual mechanisms. But I think that similar 
approaches have wide applicability, and I will make what at first seems like a 
digression to demonstrate the point in studies of facial first impressions. 
Our impressions of other people from their appearance have long 
attracted interest, and were of course central to ideas now usually dismissed 
as pseudoscientific, such as the overstated claims of the physiognomists (see 
Bruce & Young, 1998, 2012; Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 
2015; Todorov, 2017). Nowadays, few would claim that someone's character 
and other traits can validly be inferred from their facial appearance, though it 
Faces, people and the brain 23!
remains possible that there is a 'kernel of truth' that leads to slightly better 
than chance performance for some attributions (Berry, 1990; Kramer & Ward, 
2010; Penton-Voak, Pound, Little, & Perrett, 2006). 
Although they are of questionable validity, however, we form surprisingly 
consistent subjective impressions of traits such as friendliness or intelligence 
from images of faces. So how do we do this? The question is of some 
practical as well as theoretical interest because of the remarkable proliferation 
of online relationships and interactions in which a posted photo may form a 
primary source of information about someone you haven't actually met; for 
example, Meetic Group (a parent company owning online dating agencies) 
claims to have had more than six billion unique visitors to its websites and to 
have introduced six million European couples (Meetic Group, 2017). 
To try to capture the full range of potential cues my colleagues and I 
have adopted a data-driven approach to understanding first impressions of 
faces (Oldmeadow, Sutherland, & Young, 2013; Santos and Young, 2005, 
2008, 2011; South Palomares & Young, 2017; Sutherland et al., 2013, 2015a; 
Sutherland, Oldmeadow, & Young, 2016; Sutherland, Young, Mootz, & 
Oldmeadow, 2015b). We began by collecting 1,000 everyday face images 
from the internet. These were all non-famous Caucasian adults (to avoid 
other-race effects in initial studies) and the photos were as varied as possible, 
with no constraints on ages (other than being of adult appearance), 
expressions, poses, accessories (facial hair, piercings, glasses), or lighting 
and image quality. We then had each face image rated on several 
characteristics; its apparent trustworthiness, intelligence, attractiveness, and 
so on. These characteristics were subjectively, not objectively defined, in the 
sense that we didn't actually know how trustworthy or intelligent each person 
might really be, but were instead interested in how trustworthy or intelligent 
they looked in that photo. 
The first thing we found was that inter-rater agreement was good, even 
with these unstandardised images. Participants agree with each other as to 
which images look trustworthy or whatever, in line with findings using more 
controlled images (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov et al., 2015). 
Moreover, this agreement seems to reflect the fact that participants make use 
of consistent cues. By averaging images rated high or low on a given trait we 
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can create prototypes that seem to represent its essential characteristics, as 
shown in Figure 5 (from Sutherland et al., 2013). This averaging can only 
'work' well if the individual images contain consistent cues or combinations of 
cues; inconsistent or idiosyncratic cues will largely be averaged out 
(Sutherland et al., 2017a). By morphing between the high and low prototypes 
we could create graded levels of each trait (see Figure 5), which again 
demonstrates that key cues have been successfully captured.  
 
----- FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
Being able to visualise the cues that create different impressions 
represents a step forward, but we were then able to build on pioneering work 
by Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) to capture the underlying structure of these 
subjective impressions. Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) had applied PCA to 
ratings encompassing several different traits and found that these could be 
modelled as falling along two underlying dimensions that could be 
approximated by perceived trustworthiness and perceived dominance. From a 
factor analysis of ratings of 13 traits across our 1,000 highly varied face 
photographs we identified a three-factor solution (Sutherland et al., 2013).  
The first factor identified by Sutherland et al. (2013) corresponds to 
approachability; it is similar to the trustworthiness factor found by Oosterhof 
and Todorov (2008). The second factor we labelled youthful attractiveness. 
The third factor involves perceived dominance; it is comparable to Oosterhof 
and Todorov's (2008) second factor. 
Sutherland et al.'s (2013) three-factor model is thus an expanded 
version of Oosterhof and Todorov's (2008) two-factor scheme. In Oosterhof 
and Todorov's (2008) study, perceived attractiveness resulted from a 
combination of their two factors, whereas in Sutherland et al. (2013) it 
emerged as a factor in its own right. The reason is almost certainly because 
Sutherland et al. (2013) used faces from a wider range of ages than 
Oosterhof and Todorov (2008), underlining the importance of the nature of the 
stimulus sample to data-driven approaches (Todorov et al., 2015; Todorov, 
2017). 
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Sutherland et al.'s (2013) factors are visualised in Figure 5 by creating 
factor loadings for each image and then averaging the 20 highest and 20 
lowest images for each factor. Like the averages for specific traits shown in 
Figure 5, these averaged images representing each factor show that each 
factor involves multiple interacting cues. This has important implications for 
understanding facial first impressions. For example, the averaged face-like 
images representing high levels of approachability depict smiling individuals, 
whereas the images representing low levels contain more neutral or even 
slightly hostile expressions, which is consistent with previous research (Hess, 
Adams, & Kleck, 2004; Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009). However, the face-like 
averages also show clearly that smiling does not in itself constitute an 
exclusive cue to approachability. Instead, high versus low levels of all three 
factors involve differences in smiling; what is important is possibly the type of 
smile, and certainly the way smiling is combined with other cues such as skin 
tone, age, and face shape. To understand first impressions from faces, then, 
we will need to understand how different cues are interpreted in combination 
with each other (Santos & Young, 2011; South Palomares & Young, 2017; 
Todorov, 2017) instead of investigating each cue in isolation. The same point 
had been made in seminal studies by Secord (1958) and is of course in line 
with evidence of the importance of holistic processing in many aspects of face 
perception (Abbas & Duchaine, 2008; Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000; 
Chen, Ren, Young, & Liu, 2017; Rossion, 2013; Sormaz, Andrews, & Young, 
2013; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Todorov, Loehr, & Oosterhof, 2010; Young, 
Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). 
This point about the importance of combinations of cues became very 
clear when we sought to model subjective impressions from objective physical 
attributes (Vernon, Sutherland, Young, & Hartley, 2014). Using the same 
1,000 everyday images, Vernon et al. (2014) created loadings for each image 
on Sutherland et al.'s (2013) three underlying factors from a factor analysis of 
16 traits rated by human observers. They then positioned 179 fiducial points 
onto each face and used these together with colour and brightness values to 
objectively define 65 physical ÔattributesÕ such as feature positions, feature 
shapes, skin and lip colour. These 65 physical attributes were then used as 
inputs to a linear network that was trained to fit the three Sutherland et al. 
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(2013) factors (its outputs) to a subset of the 1,000 images, and the network's 
performance was evaluated through its ability to predict human ratings for 
untrained images (Vernon et al., 2014). This procedure was repeated a 
number of times, to arrive at estimates of the network's ability to predict the 
approachability, youthful attractiveness and dominance of every one of the 
1,000 face images. 
 
----- FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
Correlations between the factor scores from human ratings and scores 
predicted from a linear network that had been trained on entirely different 
images are shown in Figure 6. Impressively, the linear network was able to 
explain 58% of the variance in the evaluations of these highly varied face 
images by human observers. Moreover, in this case the performance of 
networks capable of finding non-linear relationships showed no overall 
improvement. 
When Vernon et al. (2014) looked at which physical attributes are critical 
to different types of impression, they found that most of the 65 attributes were 
significantly correlated with more than one factor. This reinforces the 
implications from Sutherland et al.'s (2013) findings that it is how different 
features are combined with each other that is critical; the same feature can 
mean different things in different combinations. 
The implications of these simulations are that our first impressions of 
faces can largely be driven by making use of covariation among available 
cues. Analysing the image statistics again gives us a clearer picture of the 
brain's task (see also Dotsch, Hassin, & Todorov, 2016). Although this 
represents significant progress in understanding the mechanisms involved, 
we still have a relatively poor understanding of the underlying factors that 
make these impressions so pervasive in our everyday lives. At one extreme, it 
is tempting to postulate an evolutionary background. For example, evaluations 
of trustworthiness may involve the perceived intention of a conspecific to help 
or harm you, dominance involves capability to carry out these intentions, and 
attractiveness may be a signal of genetic fitness (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; 
Sutherland et al., 2013). But a powerful alternative is that the basis lies not so 
Faces, people and the brain 27!
much in our primate ancestry as in the overgeneralisation of contingencies 
present in our everyday environments (Secord, 1958; Zebrowitz, 2017) and 
from social stereotypes which may themselves reflect weak environmental 
contingencies (Sutherland et al., 2015). Of course, these are not mutually 
exclusive possibilities, but one promising way to tease apart their 
contributions may again be through neuropsychological studies. For example, 
Sprengelmeyer et al. (2016) found that atypical first impressions of faces by 
patients with Huntington's disease were correlated with impairments affecting 
recognition of facial expressions; a finding that is very much in line with 
Secord's (1958) and Zebrowitz's (2017) ideas. 
Another finding that fits in well with Zebrowitz's (2017) general approach 
in terms of overgeneralisation from perceived cues concerns the importance 
of within-person image variability. It is very tempting to treat differences in 
perceived trustworthiness, attractiveness or dominance as properties of the 
face being viewed, but often they are just as much properties of a specific 
photograph. This was emphasised by Jenkins, White, Van Montfort and 
Burton (2011), who showed that differences in the rated attractiveness of 
different photographs of the same person's face can be as large as the 
differences between faces of different individuals. Sutherland, Young and 
Rhodes (2017b) found that this is equally true for perceived trustworthiness 
and dominance (see Figure 7) and demonstrated how differences in viewpoint 
and expression make interacting contributions to these impressions. 
 
----- FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
This point about the variability between different views of the same face 
also has important implications for understanding how we recognise face 
identity. Although image variability can create very different first impressions 
of a face, it is largely irrelevant to determining the face's identity; we want to 
be able to recognise people we know across many different views. A powerful 
insight into the role of image variability in recognising face identity is offered 
by a sorting task devised by Jenkins et al. (2011). Participants were given a 
set of 40 everyday photographs of faces like those shown in Figure 8 and 
asked to sort these into piles of photographs of the same person. 
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----- FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
In fact there are only two faces in Figure 8, and anyone who knows 
these people will experience little trouble in creating a fully correct solution of 
two piles of 20 images each (Jenkins et al., 2011). However, when the faces 
used by Jenkins et al. (2011) were unfamiliar to their participants, they 
created between 3 to16 different piles (identities). In other words, with varied 
images of unfamiliar faces, participants always thought there more identities 
than were actually present in the set of 40 photos, and often substantially 
more.  
This finding runs counter to a widely accepted intuition (which can be 
traced back at least as far as Galton,1883) that faces form a homogeneous 
class of visual stimuli and that, in consequence, people mainly struggle to tell 
similar faces apart. Instead, Jenkins et al.'s (2011) data show that participants 
are more likely to see photos of unfamiliar faces as more diverse than they 
actually are (thus, they create too many piles). The problem is as much one of 
seeing that very different images can represent the same unfamiliar face 
identity as of telling faces apart (Andrews, Jenkins, Cursiter, & Burton, 2015). 
Similar difficulties occur in other perceptual matching tasks, such as 
comparing someone's face to their passport photograph, where performance 
with unfamiliar faces can be surprisingly error-prone (Bruce et al., 1999; 
Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2001; Kemp, Towell, & Pike, 1997). 
Jenkins et al. (2011) discussed their findings in terms of the idea of 
image variability. Photographs of faces differ in many ways that include pose, 
expression, lighting, camera, and lens characteristics. Importantly, real-life 
views of faces are also highly variable; this is true whether the faces are seen 
in person, in videos, or photographs. This variability can result from within-
person variability (e.g., differences between different views of the same face) 
or between-person variability (e.g., differences between similar views of 
different faces). As Figure 8 shows, within-person variability can be 
substantial.  
As was already noted, Jenkins et al.'s (2011) sorting task is much easier 
with familiar faces, with participants then rarely putting photos of the two 
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different individuals into the same pile (less than 1% of trials). Indeed most of 
us can recognise familiar faces without difficulty across changes in pose and 
expression, and in very variable lighting. Yet, in stark contrast, we have seen 
that equivalent image changes create significant problems in recognising the 
faces of people we don't know well. Understanding how view-invariant 
recognition of familiar faces is achieved, and why recognition of unfamiliar 
faces across equivalent image changes is relatively poor, are therefore key 
theoretical tasks (Burton, 2013; Burton, Jenkins, Hancock, & White, 2005; 
Burton, Jenkins, & Schweinberger, 2011; Bindemann & Johnston, 2017; 
Davies & Young, 2017; Young & Burton, 2017).  
A recent study by Burton, Kramer, Ritchie and Jenkins (2016) marks a 
substantial advance. Burton et al. analysed how images of the same face vary 
by applying PCA to everyday photographs of the same person. As we already 
noted, PCA is a statistical technique that can reduce the dimensionality of 
photographs to a relatively small number of principal components (PCs). This 
is a widely used technique in the computer science literature, but it is mostly 
applied to images of different faces. That is, researchers usually run PCA 
across images of many different faces to find the PCs of faces in general. 
Often, too, the images used in PCA are photographed under standard 
conditions, to eliminate changes in pose, expression, lighting and so on. 
Burton et al.'s (2016) application of PCA to everyday images of the same 
face represents a different approach. Instead of asking what image properties 
can distinguish between all faces (by finding PCs across different faces), they 
asked what properties characterise the highly variable images that correspond 
to a specific face identity. What Burton et al. found was that different faces 
have different PCs. Put simply, the ways in which one person's face varies 
from image to image is different from the way in which someone else's face 
will vary. The characteristics that vary or remain relatively consistent across 
images differ between one person and another. 
These differences are comprehensively demonstrated in Burton et al.'s 
(2016) paper, and Kramer, Jenkins and Burton (2017a) have made available 
the software tools used in the analyses. The implication of Burton et al.'s 
(2016) data is that we have to learn separately the relatively variant and 
invariant characteristics of each of the faces we know, and this immediately 
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explains why unfamiliar face identity can be problematic. Variability across 
images is to some extent identity-specific. We need to learn which 
characteristics of a particular face are relatively consistent and which are 
variable. For unfamiliar faces our brains can't readily interpret whether image 
differences are identity-relevant or not. 
In this light we need to think carefully about the widely used concept of 
face expertise. It is often said that that we spend so much time looking at 
faces that we are all 'face experts' (Carey, 1992; Diamond & Carey, 1986). 
Certainly, phenomena such as the other-race effect show that adult 
perceptual mechanisms have become tuned to dealing with particular types of 
faces (see Rossion & Michel, 2011). However, the idea of expertise is usually 
applied in the case of face identity, and is often invoked in studies involving 
recognition of unfamiliar faces, but Burton et al.'s (2016) findings show that 
the concept of expertise seems to apply more closely to our ability to 
recognise familiar rather than unfamiliar faces. In effect, we have become 
particularly expert at recognising each of the faces we know (Young & Burton, 
2017; see also Johnston, Overell, Kaufman, Robinson, & Young, 2016). In 
contrast, unfamiliar face identity can be problematic because some of the 
relevant image statistics are unknown, which can often make unfamiliar face 
learning surprisingly image-dependent (Bruce, 1982; Longmore, Liu. & Young, 
2008; Longmore et al., 2017). This sets limits on our expertise with unfamiliar 
face identity. 
This is not to deny that there are many things we can reliably judge from 
unfamiliar faces, as the studies of facial expression and first impressions have 
shown. These may also reflect some form of expertise, but it seems to involve 
characteristics that reflect relatively generic visual properties. The generic 
properties also include important social categories of gender, race and 
apparent age (Bruce & Young, 2012). For these, the idea of expertise may 
again have some merit, but the evidence is mixed. Although we are often 
thought to have become so expert at perceiving such categories in faces that 
they will be seen automatically (e.g. Martin, et al., 2015), they actually show 
only a somewhat limited form of automaticity if stringent criteria are applied 
(Yan, Young, & Andrews, 2017c); see Palermo and Rhodes (2007) for a 
review of automaticity and face perception. 
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There has also been debate about how perceived social categories of 
gender and ethnicity relate to face identity. Bruce & Young (1986) maintained 
that there must be some separation between the coding of gender and identity 
because we can easily classify the gender of unfamiliar faces, and Bruce, 
Ellis, Gibling and Young (1987) showed that having a gender-stereotypical 
appearance affected decisions about a familiar face's sex but had no effect on 
recognising its identity. Bruce and Young (1986) therefore drew a distinction 
between identity-specific semantic codes based on recognising a familiar face 
and the visually-derived semantic codes (such as gender or race) created by 
its appearance. However, other widely discussed models such as Haxby et al. 
(2000) elide this distinction by shifting the focus onto the fact that 
characteristics such as gender, race, and identity represent relatively invariant 
facial attributes. Consistent with this type of account, some data support the 
idea of a more integral representation of gender and identity (Goshen-
Gottstein & Ganel, 2000; Rossion 2002; Zhao & Hayward, 2013). 
Recently, we approached these questions in a novel way, by asking how 
social categories of gender and race might be learnt (Kramer, Young, Day, & 
Burton, 2017c). A natural intuition is that learning the difference between male 
and female faces must involve a great deal of practice, perhaps driven by 
evolved mechanisms for sexual selection and assisted by more salient cues 
from body shape, voice, and in many cultures clothing. Similarly, one might 
think that learning about race is driven by social mechanisms concerning 
group membership, and such factors feature prominently in some theories of 
other-race effects in face recognition (Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool. 2007; 
Sporer, Trinkl, & Guberova, 2007). However, and rather to our surprise, we 
discovered that such explicit learning of gender or race isn't necessary; these 
social categories can instead be an emergent property of learning to 
recognise a small number of familiar faces from multiple different images of 
each person (Kramer et al., 2017c). 
Kramer et al. (2017c) used a combination of PCA and LDA to identify 
highly varied images of different face identities; these trained faces can then 
be considered as 'familiar' to the model. The trained model showed properties 
analogous to human face recognition in that it performed well at ÔrecognisingÕ 
new (untrained) images of familiar faces and performed less well at 
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establishing whether images of unfamiliar (i.e. untrained) faces were of the 
same person. Remarkably, following training for recognising identity, the first 
dimension from the LDA separated male from female faces with over 95% 
correct accuracy for untrained images of both familiar and completely novel 
unfamiliar faces. Moreover, high levels of performance at separating face 
images by gender were found even with only a small number of trained 
identities (>90% correct after training with 5 men and 5 women). Comparable 
findings were found for classifying faces by race, which emerged as the 
second dimension from the LDA (Kramer et al., 2017c). 
In sum, incidental learning of gender and race can be a natural 
consequence of learning a small number of familiar face identities. It seems 
that the cues needed to distinguish the gender or race of any face covary with 
those needed to recognise familiar identities. This is interesting because 
learning to recognise a small number of familiar individuals closely 
approximates the task facing human infants in many societies. In contrast, 
Kramer et al. (2017c) found that a model trained only to classify gender 
offered no benefit to classifying identity. 
The findings I have summarised make a powerful case that our brains 
can often make good use of image statistics, but we need to be careful not to 
overstate this. If we return to issues concerning plasticity, it is clear that as we 
grow up we become particularly tuned to some image properties at the 
expense of others (e.g. Rossion & Michel, 2011) and that whilst this confers 
advantages in everyday life, it incurs a cost in more unusual circumstances. 
For example Kramer, Jenkins, Young and Burton (2017b) found that adults 
can only use image statistics when faces are presented in familiar formats. 
 
----- FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE ----- 
 
Kramer et al. (2017b) asked participants to watch episodes of TV soap 
operas they had never seen before in different formats that involved normal 
colour videos, upside-down colour videos, normal greyscale videos, and 
contrast-reversed greyscale videos. They were then tested for their ability to 
recognise new (unseen) images of the characters from the soap operas; this 
is a strong test of face familiarisation. Recognition was tested in the same 
Faces, people and the brain 33!
format or the opposite format to that in which participants had watched the TV 
show. 
Results from Kramer et al.'s (2017b) study are summarised in Figure 9. 
In terms of general image statistics there is no real difference between normal 
and inverted videos, or between normal greyscale and contrast-reversed 
videos; the ranges and types of variability are equivalent in each case. Yet 
only faces that were both learnt and tested in a normal format showed 
effective learning. In other words, participants were unable to use information 
that was present in the unusual formats. The mere presence of multiple, 
variable views in the seen videos was not in itself useful; this variability could 
only be exploited to learn characteristics of the faces if they were presented in 
a format that would fit with participants' previous experience. We know, for 
example, that upright faces are much more commonly seen than inverted 
faces from early infancy (Sugden & Moulson, 2017). 
 
Overview 
 
The First Bartlett Lecture was given by Carolus Oldfield in 1966, on 
'Things, words and the brain'. Oldfield (1966) discussed the cognitive and 
neural processes involved in retrieving words in speech, using object naming 
as a particularly useful paradigm and bringing to bear on it evidence from both 
experiments (e.g. Oldfield & Wingfield, 1965) and neuropsychological 
phenomena (Newcombe, Oldfield, & Wingfield, 1965). 
A number of us who worked in the relatively novel field of face 
recognition in the 1980s will recall that we tried to fill a theoretical vacuum 
identified by Hadyn Ellis (1975; see also Davies & Young, 2017) by taking 
Oldfield's (1966) agenda and transporting it from the study of words and 
things to the study of faces and people, whilst mixing in a few other ideas from 
contemporary cognitive models of word recognition (see Young & Bruce, 
2011). So on the principle that imitation remains the sincerest form of flattery I 
decided to mimic Oldfield's title here, simply changing the topic from 'Things, 
words and the brain' to 'Faces, people and the brain'. 
Although it proved a fruitful way to begin, if everything that the field of 
face recognition had accomplished was built on copying ready-made research 
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agendas from elsewhere I doubt that it would still command so much interest. 
What has substantially enhanced the field's appeal is appreciation of its 
relation to broader questions about face and person perception. My main aim 
here has been to use the fact that the face is a source of diverse social 
signals to ask important questions about the underlying principles that 
determine how our brains are organised. We have looked at evidence 
relevant to understanding constraints that underpin the functional architecture 
of face and person perception resulting from the evolved structure of the 
brain, the need to optimise responses to different everyday tasks, and the 
statistical properties of facial and other signals in the environment. I have 
shown that these constraints are not mutually exclusive; instead, they interact 
to determine the optimal organisation. So, for example, differences between 
the recognition of identity and emotion reflect a combination of statistical 
properties of the input (where there is partial but not complete segregation), 
covariation and complementarity of cues across different modalities (such as 
face and voice), and whether the environment sets a premium on detecting 
change (emotion) or permits a working assumption of stability (identity). 
Along the way I have also sought to bring out some more specific take-
home messages about approaches to studying face and person perception. 
The first of these messages involves the usefulness of a combination of 
naturally varying ambient images and data-driven approaches in identifying 
key characteristics of our face perception abilities. This approach contrasts 
with the natural temptation to try to work with standardised images that 
eliminate as much variability as possible and home in straight away on 
specific cues. Although there is still a role for trying to tease apart the relative 
contributions of different cues (cf. Sutherland et al., 2017b), it needs to be 
tempered by the second message, which is that cue covariation and cue 
complementarity are common properties of many face and person perception 
tasks. This means that the quest for the specific 'diagnostic cue' that is 
exclusively needed to perceive a given characteristic will often prove futile. It 
is more important to understand how our brains exploit natural cue covariation 
than to search for any unique cues involved. This leads to my third message, 
which is that multi-attribute models can capture much of this covariation, but 
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adult brains have reached a point where they can only use covariation that 
falls within a previously learnt range.  
More generally, an emerging theme has been that the implications of the 
idea of creating stability from variation (Bruce, 1994, Burton, 2013) should be 
taken seriously. Image variability is not simply a nuisance, as is so often 
assumed, but neither is it everything that needs to be understood. Instead, we 
have seen that variability has to be used in different ways for different 
purposes. As is so often the case in psychology, we need to look at the 
interplay between different constraining factors to understand the way we do 
the things we do. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Functional model of face perception suggested by Bruce & Young 
(1986). 
 
 
Faces, people and the brain 58!
Figure 2: The upper panel shows the location of face-responsive regions from 
fMRI: the occipital face area (OFA), fusiform face area (FFA), and 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) alongside Haxby et al.'s (2000) 
proposals concerning functional organisation of the neural network 
involved in face perception. The lower panel redraws the Bruce and 
Young (1986) model to bring out its similarities to Haxby et al. 
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Figure 3: Upper panel: schematic arrangement of emotion hexagon stimuli 
from Calder et al. (1996) and Young et al. (2002). Each emotion is 
placed next to that it is most often confused with. The images are then 
morphed between happiness and surprise (top row), surprise and fear 
(second row), fear and sadness (third row), sadness and disgust (fourth 
row), disgust and anger (fifth row), and anger and happiness (bottom 
row). The lower panel shows performance by participant DR (Calder et 
al., 1996). The 30 images from the emotion hexagon are set out along 
the horizontal axis, with the proportion of correct recognition by DR (solid 
lines) and control participants (dashed lines) represented along the 
vertical axis. The percentages show DR's ability to recognise each 
emotion expressed as a percentage of control performance. (Adapted 
from Calder et al., 1996, and reproduced with permission from Taylor & 
Francis). 
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Figure 4: Results from Hagan et al.'s (2009) study. Stimuli were fearful or 
neutral Ekman faces and nonverbal sounds presented in auditory (A), 
visual (V), or audio-visual (AV) conditions. The analysis identifies a 
region in right STG/STS (crosshairs MNI 60, -46, 18) showing a multi-
modal response to audio-visual fear that meets a stringent criterion of 
supra-additivity (AV>A+V) based on a broadband (3-80Hz) increase in 
power. This is plotted across a 500ms moving window at 50 ms 
intervals. Note that the response is present at early latencies and fades 
by 200 ms. 
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Figure 5: The upper panel shows everyday face images similar to those used 
by Sutherland et al. (2013). The central panel shows representative 
continua (intelligence, confidence, and trustworthiness) created by 
morphing between averages of 20 images rated as low (on the left) and 
20 images rated as high (on the right) for each trait. The lower panel 
shows averages of the 20 images loading highest or lowest on factors of 
approachability, youthful-attractiveness, and dominance. (Central and 
lower panels reprinted from Sutherland et al., 2013, part of Figure 1, p. 
109 and Figure 2A, p. 113, with permission from Elsevier). 
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Figure 6: Scatterplots from Vernon et al.'s (2014) study showing the 
correlations between experimentally derived factor scores (from human 
raters) and the corresponding predictions for untrained images, derived 
from a linear neural network. Each data point (n = 1,000, for all axes) 
represents the observed and predicted ratings for a distinct face image. 
Overall correlations are 0.90 for approachability (scatterplot A), 0.70 for 
youthful attractiveness (scatterplot B), and 0.67 for dominance 
(scatterplot C). 
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Figure 7: Data from Sutherland et al. (2017b). Mean trustworthiness (top), 
dominance (middle), and attractiveness (bottom) ratings of face 
photographs from the KDEF set (Lundqvist et al., 1998) of images 
varying in terms of identity, expression, and viewpoint. Results are 
plotted separately for female faces (left) and male faces (right). Each 
column represents a single identity, and each point represents a single 
photograph, with the overall mean rating for each identity shown as a 
darker point. The horizontal axis represents the between-person 
variability (the face identities, ranked by their overall mean 
trustworthiness, dominance, or attractiveness). The vertical axis 
represents the within-person variability (the different photographs of 
each person). Within-person variability (the differences between different 
images of the same face) is typically as large as between-person 
variability (the differences between different faces). 
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Figure 8: An example of the task used by Jenkins et al. (2011). Participants 
are asked to sort the 40 images into the different face identities. Most 
people only arrive at the correct solution if they already know the faces. 
For unfamiliar faces, participants tend to mistake differences between 
the images for differences in identity, leading them to overestimate the 
number of faces in the display. (Reprinted from Jenkins et al., 2011, 
Figure 2, p. 316, with permission from Elsevier). 
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Figure 9: Kramer et al.'s (2017b) study. The upper panel shows sensitivity 
indices (dÕ) for recognition of faces learnt from upright and inverted 
video, when tested with upright and inverted photographs. The lower 
panel shows sensitivity for recognition of faces learnt from positive and 
negative contrast greyscale videos, when tested with positive and 
negative contrast greyscale photographs. Errors bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. An example test image in each format is shown 
alongside the relevant data. (Reproduced with permission from Taylor & 
Francis). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
